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Abstract 
Besides deterring people, laws may affect behavior by changing preferences or 
beliefs. A law may elicit intrinsic motivation by framing an act as wrong. Alternatively, it 
may coordinate the behavior of different people by changing their beliefs about what others 
will do. We investigate framing and coordination effects experimentally in prisoner’s 
dilemma, “crowding” and coordination games. We simulate a law by imposing a probabilistic 
penalty on one of the choices. In the prisoner’s dilemma and the crowding game, announcing 
the penalty had no effect. In the coordination game, announcing the penalty caused behavior 
to jump to the Pareto-superior equilibrium.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A law, conventionally defined as an obligation backed by a sanction, can affect 
behavior in at least three ways. First, fear of sanctions deters some people from breaking the 
law.  The theory of deterrence explains law’s effects on behavior by the probability and 
severity of sanctions and the elasticity of demand curves.
1 Second, framing an act as illegal 
can elicit intrinsic motivation to avoid it.  Many citizens comply with law from respect, not 
fear.  The theory of framing explains law’s effects on behavior by the intensity and 
malleability of respect for law.  Third, a law can coordinate the behavior of people by helping 
them to predict what others will do.  The theory of coordination explains law’s effects on 
behavior by the credibility of the equilibrium selection principle it offers.
2  
This paper examines the relative strength of the latter two effects, framing and 
coordination, experimentally. The experiments do not concern the first effect, deterrence.  We 
build on an extensive literature concerning whether changes in the representation of choices 
influence decisions in games (for a review, see Camerer 1995).  In one famous framing 
experiment, Ross and Ward (1996: 108) found significantly more cooperation from labelling 
a two-person prisoner’s dilemma (PD) as the “Community Game” rather than the “Wall 
Street Game.”  They concluded with this question:  
“Further research will be required to determine exactly why the particular label 
attached to the game exerted so large an effect – that is, to what extent the label 
influenced subjects directly (i.e. determined the way subjects felt they ought to play) 
and to what extent it influenced them indirectly (i.e. by changing their expectations 
about how the other player would expect them to play).” 
 
Our experimental design allows us to answer this question as applied to sanctions.   
To simulate a legal sanction, we tell subjects in our experimental group that one 
choice will result in a probabilistic “penalty” in dollars. We offset the probabilistic penalty by 
                                                
1 For a review of the "imperative theory of law” in Anglo-American jurisprudence, see Raz (1980).  
2 For three effects of legal obligations on behavior, see Cooter (2000).  
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an increase in the certain payoff from doing the penalized act.  Holding constant the behavior 
of others, the expected monetary payoff from doing the penalized act remains unchanged.  
Consequently, any effect of the penalty on the experimental group must occur because 
players change their subjective valuation of the dollar payoffs (e.g., guilt decreases the value 
of the penalized act), or because they change their beliefs about what others will do.   
We wish to separate and compare the penalty’s effect on preferences and beliefs.  
Prisoner’s dilemma and crowding games have a uniquely best strategy for a selfish player, 
regardless of the strategies played by others.  In such a game, the Nash equilibrium does not 
change when a player changes his beliefs about what others will do.  Consequently, 
introducing a probabilistic penalty (and an offsetting increase in the certain payoff) can only 
affect behavior by changing preferences.  Preferences change to the extent that a penalty 
elicits intrinsic motivation.  We found that announcing a penalty in the prisoner’s dilemma 
and “crowding” games had no effect on behavior.  Intrinsic motivation was too weak to 
overcome the dominant, self-interested strategy.   
Next we experimented with coordination games in which a player’s best strategy 
depends on the strategies of other players.  These games have multiple Nash equilibria.  A 
penalty can help to select among equilibria. We found that announcing a penalty for the 
“wrong” choice caused behavior to jump to the “right” choice.     
Our experimental results confirm our hypothesis about law in general: sanctions affect 
behavior more by changing beliefs than preferences.  When navigating a world with cultural 
diversity, organized interest groups, and unreliable regulators, scepticism about the moral 
value of legal pronouncements preserves moral compass.  While scepticism about law’s 
morality inhibits intrinsic motivation, coordination effects can still operate.  
While our experiments only concern coordination and framing, the results have 
significance for deterrence. Deterrence causes actors to adjust behavior to equate marginal  
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benefits and costs, which involves small changes.  In contrast, coordination causes behavior 
to jump from one equilibrium to another, which involves large changes.  Consequently, our 
results suggest that coordination has larger effects than deterrence in law.  Almost all of law 
and economics focuses on deterrence and neglects coordination.
3  Law and economics 
apparently concentrates on law’s small effects and neglects its large effects.    
The paper is organized as follows: Part II reviews the relevant scholarship on framing 
and equilibrium selection.  Part III describes the experimental design.  Part IV presents our 
results. The paper concludes with Part V.  
 
 
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON FRAMING AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 
A sanction lowers the payoff to the sanctioned act relative to unsanctioned acts.  
“Payoff” describes the sanction’s effect in morally neutral language, whereas “penalty” 
implies that the act is wrong.  In our experiments, we referred to a reduction in payoffs as a 
“penalty.”  We will review the literature on the question of how this change might affect 
preferences and beliefs.   
 
A. Framing: Change of preferences 
Introducing a probabilistic penalty and an offsetting increase in certain payoffs keeps 
material outcomes constant while changing their description.
4 Subjective Expected Utility 
theory predicts no change in behavior from changing the description of payoffs.  Changed 
                                                
3 To illustrate, textbooks in law and economics have almost nothing to say about law’s coordination effects.  
See, e.g., Cooter and Ulen (1999) or Posner (1998).  Recent exceptions to this generalization are McAdams 
(2000) and Hay and Shleifer (1998) who argue that the potentially most significant benefit of public laws in 
emerging economies is that they become the focal point and can coordinate expectations even with little 
enforcement.  
4Given the comparatively small stakes in experiments, we assume risk neutrality (Rabin 2000). Recent evidence 
suggests that this is probably also the most accurate assumption descriptively (Harbaugh et al. 2003). The results 
in Harbaugh et al. (2003) also suggest that it is unclear whether people overweight small probabilities as 
assumed by Prospect Theory in actual choice tasks.    
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behavior from changed descriptions violates the axiom of “descriptive invariance.” A 
psychological theory of framing, however, predicts that changing descriptions might change 
behavior (Tversky and Kahneman 1986).  First, “penalty” connotes wrongdoing, which might 
incur psychological cost such as guilt.  Second, “penalty” suggests a loss in dollar payoffs 
(even though an increase in the dollar value of certain payoffs offsets the probabilistic 
penalty).  According to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), redescribing payoffs 
as a loss can cause loss averse individuals to change their behavior.  In our experiments, loss 
averse individuals might avoid the “wrong” action in the experimental group and not in the 
control treatment.  
The two possible framing effects of a penalty–guilt and loss aversion–operate in the 
same direction in all of our games.  For our purposes, it does not matter whether framing 
operates through guilt or loss aversion.  Instead of trying to separate these framing effects, we 
will discuss evidence about their magnitude.   
Framing effects of the term “penalty” have not been investigated as yet.  However, 
guilt induced by “harming others” has been studied.  In public goods games, the non-
cooperative choice can be described as “harming others,” which is a “guilt frame.”  
Alternatively, the cooperative choice can be described as “benefiting others,” which is a 
“warm-glow frame.”  Guilt frames have been found to influence behavior less than warm-
glow frames (Andreoni 1995, Cookson 2000, and Sonnemans et al 1998).
5 People were more 
likely to cooperate when cooperation was framed as a positive externality than when 
defection was framed as a negative externality.  
                                                                                                                                                  
  
5 Andreoni (1995) and Cookson (2000) used standard linear public goods games while Sonnemans et al. (1998) 
used a step-level public goods game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Studies using hypothetical 
incentives have generally not found any effects of such framing (e.g. Fleishman et al. 1988, Messick et al 1993 
and Rutte et al 1987). Brewer and Kramer (1986) found a “guilt” effect in a hypothetical common pool resource 
game.   
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If players perceive positive complementarities and thus multiple equilibria in a public 
goods game, then they think of themselves as facing a coordination problem.
6  Researchers 
were apparently more likely to find “framing effects” when their design created the 
perception of a game with multiple equilibria rather than a unique Nash equilibrium.  We 
suggest that the experimenters were actually observing coordination effects, not preference 
changes.  This reinterpretation of their results suggests that behavior changed from changed 
beliefs, not changed preferences.
7 
 
B. Equilibrium selection: Change of expectations 
Announcing a probabilistic penalty that does not change the equilibrium (and is offset 
by an increase in the certain payoff) is “cheap talk.” Despite being cheap, some forms of talk 
have been found to affect behavior in prisoner’s dilemma and coordination games.
8  Unlike 
most experiments on cheap talk, however, our subjects do not talk to each other (or to the 
experimenter).  Rather, the small penalty is introduced by an “external authority” (the 
experimenter), and thus can be interpreted as a “common information assignment” to all 
subjects (Brandts and MacLeod 1995, Van Huyck et al. 1992, Wilson and Rhodes 1997).   
Experimental evidence suggests that assigned information can serve as an equilibrium 
selection principle, provided that the assignment does not compete with another focal 
principle. Information assignments guiding the players to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium 
                                                
6 See Camerer (2003) who identifies “what game people think they are playing” as one of the “top ten open 
research questions.”  
7 Farrell and Rabin (1996) made a similar point regarding two-person prisoner’s dilemma games. They argued 
that the results suggest that experimental participants perceived them as coordination games where 
psychological benefits of “both cooperating” induced the players to cooperate if the other did but not otherwise. 
While we are agnostic about the specific form of intrinsic motivation here, see for a survey of the theories and 
the empirical evidence on social preferences, Fehr and Schmidt (2001).  
8 Higher cooperation rates are typically found for two-way, face-to-face communication rather than for one-way 
or anonymous communication in prisoner’s dilemma games (see, e.g., Bohnet and Frey 1999, Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer 1998, and for a meta-analysis, Sally 1995). In coordination games, two-way communication 
increases coordination rates in stag hunt games while one-way communication works better in the battle of the 
sexes game (see e.g. Charness 1998, Cooper et al. 1992 and for a survey, Camerer 2003).   
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have been found to be particularly successful (Van Huyck et al. 1992).  A penalty on the 
strategy leading to the Pareto-inferior equilibrium can guide people to the strategy leading to 
the Pareto-superior equilibrium if people want to avoid guilt and losses. Similar to Cachon 
and Camerer (1996), “loss and guilt-avoidance” can be used as focal principles to exclude 
strategies that may induce monetary and psychological cost.  
Based on previous evidence, we expect a penalty to serve as an equilibrium selection 
principle in our coordination games but not to affect preferences in the prisoner’s dilemma or 
crowding games. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We run three different games with dichotomous choices called L and R. Each game 
had two treatment conditions. The control treatment had no penalty. We used behavior in the 
control version to see whether people’s perceptions of the game accord with objective 
material payoffs or not. The experimental treatment had a small penalty for choosing L. 
Specifically, the following description of a penalty was added to the instructions:  
Choosing L will be punished. The penalty for choosing L instead of R is 200 cents. 
The penalty will be enforced with a probability of 0.1. After you have made your choice, we 
will determine whether the penalty will be enforced. There is a deck of 9 black and 1 red 
cards. An aide will pick a card. If the card is black, the penalty will not be enforced. If the 
card is red, the penalty will be enforced. 
 
An increase of 20 cents in the certain payoff for choosing L offset the penalty.  Thus 
the penalty did not change material payoffs for a player who is not averse to the risk of losing 
money. We applied the control and the experimental treatment to three games.    
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The first game is an n-person prisoner’s dilemma. In Game 1, the marginal cost of 
choosing R (cooperation) rather than L (defection) was $2, independent of how many people 
chose to cooperate. Figure 1 presents the payoffs graphically.
9 
                
                            
                             Figure 1: The 11-person prisoner's dilemma game
10 
 
Game 2 is the crowding game with negative complementarities.  Starting with 0 R-
choosers, choosing R pays $2 more than choosing L.  Increasing the number of R-choosers 
produces negative externalities of 40 cents for all other R-choosers. Negative externalities 
accumulate as more players choose R until the sixth potential R-chooser is indifferent 
between choosing R and L.  Beyond six R-choosers, a player does better to choose L.  
Subjects thus confront a payoff table in which choosing R pays when most people choose L, 
and choosing L pays when most people choose R.  A unique, stable equilibrium occurs when 
the 6
th player is indifferent between choosing L and R (see figure 2, and payoff table 2 in 
                                                
9 Table 1 (appendix A) shows the payoff table for an 11-person game as presented to experimental participants 
in the control treatment. 
10 Figure 1 describes the payoffs as they present themselves to the marginal 11
th player.  
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9 
appendix A).
11  
 
                              Figure 2: The 11-person crowding game 
 
In Game 3, choosing R pays when most people choose R, and choosing L pays when 
most people choose L.  This is a typical coordination game with positive complementarities.  
To contrast it with the crowding game, we call it an “affiliation game”.   Game 3 has the 
same tipping point as Game 2: If 5 people choose R, the sixth player is indifferent between 
choosing R and L.  Unlike Game 2, however, this equilibrium is unstable in Game 3. Every 
R-chooser produces positive externalities of 40 cents for every other R–chooser (see figure 3, 
and payoff table 3 in appendix A).
12  All-choose-L is a stable Pareto inferior equilibrium, and 
all-choose-R is a stable Pareto-dominant equilibrium.   
 
                                                
11 While the payoffs for choosing L are the same as in the prisoner's dilemma game, the marginal cost for 
switching strategies is $2 for the last R-chooser (or the last L-chooser) only. 
12 The payoffs for choosing L are again identical to the other two games and the difference between the payoffs 
of the two strategies is $2 for the two corner solutions. 
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                          Figure 3: The 11-person affiliation game 
 
We designed the affiliation game so that the tipping point occurs with six R-choosers, 
regardless of the total number of players in the game.  Consequently, the proportion of R-
choosers required to tip behavior to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium increases as group size 
decreases. To illustrate concretely, the tipping point requires 55% R-choices in a group of 11 
players, 60% in a group of 10, 67% in a group of 9, 75% in a group of 8, and 86% in a group 
of 7. Given this design, we predict that coordinating on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium will 
be harder as group size decreases.  
Table 4 summarizes the experimental design and each cell indicates the number of 
subjects, whose overall total equals 454 individuals. 
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Table 4: Experimental design (n=group size, N=number of participants) 
Treatments  n=11   n=10  n=9  n=8  n=7 
Game 1: Prisoner's dilemma 
Control 
Sanction  
     
N=27 
N=27 
 
N=24 
N=32 
 
N=21 
N=21 
Game 2: Crowding 
Control 
Sanction 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
N=27 
N=27 
 
N=24 
N=24 
 
N=21 
N=21 
Game 3: Affiliation  
Control 
Sanction  
 
N=33 
   
 
N=30 
   
 
N=27 
N=27   
 
N=24 
N=24   
 
N=28 
N=28  
 
We had no prior belief about the particular percentage of R-choosers required to tip 
behavior to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.  We chose a range of group sizes hoping to 
identify situations where players in the game’s control version would get stuck at the Pareto-
inferior equilibrium, so we could test whether the subjects in the experimental group could 
get to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.  It turned out that groups with 11 or 10 participants 
(tipping points of 60 percent or lower) were able to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium in the control version.  These groups did not need the help of a penalty to 
coordinate their behavior. Consequently, we focused our experiments on groups with 9, 8 and 
7 participants, where the control version coordinated imperfectly (or not at all) on the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium.  
Each game was repeated five times, which was common knowledge.  Subjects were 
randomly allocated to new groups after each round. Due to our large group sizes, a true one-
shot treatment was not possible. However, subjects did not know the code numbers of other 
group members at any time. The experiments were run double-blind, with neither the  
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experimenter nor other subjects being able to identify individual decisions.
13 After the 
experimental instructions had been distributed, we also read them aloud to make sure that 
they were common knowledge. The experiments were run with students from various 
universities in the greater Boston area.
14 They received a show-up fee of $5 and earned 
approximately $10 in the experiment. Their earnings in two randomly chosen rounds 
determined payment. The experiment took 45 minutes.  
 
IV. RESULTS 
We present our main findings in this section.  
Observation 1: There is no evidence that announcing a penalty changes preferences.  
Our results of Game 1 (prisoner’s dilemma) support Observation 1.  Figure 4 presents these 
results for groups of all sizes.  Introducing a sanction did not increase the likelihood of 
choosing R, i.e. of cooperating.  Indeed, cooperation in the early rounds is typically higher in 
the control treatment than in the penalty treatment. However, round-by-round comparisons
15 
do not reveal any significant differences between cooperation rates in the control and 
experimental groups but for round 3 in groups with 7 participants (significantly more subjects 
cooperated in the control than in the sanction treatment—chi
2=6.9, p<0.01).
16  
                                                
13  The experimental procedure described in Bohnet and Frey (1999) was used. For the experimental 
instructions, see appendix B.  
14  We thank the Harvard Business School for the recruitment of the participants. Subjects were recruited by 
announcements in student newspapers in various universities in the Boston area and signed up electronically for 
experiments.  
15 We treat individual subjects as independent observations here but acknowledge that this is a second-best 
solution and that comparing group level data would be preferable. However, given our group sizes and our 
reluctance to aggregate over rounds, this would decrease our sample size most significantly, rendering any test 
meaningless.  
16 While the differences are small, they are in line with the "crowding out" of voluntary cooperation induced by 
small fines found by Bohnet et al. (2001), Fehr and Gaechter (2000), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), and more 
generally by Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997).  
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       In the control and experimental groups, cooperation declines as players repeat the 
game, with cooperation approaching the equilibrium prediction.  Our data looks very similar 
to standard repeated prisoner's dilemma games (see Ledyard 1995, Camerer 2003). 
   
                Figure 4: Percentage of R-choices in the prisoner's dilemma games 
 
Now we turn to Game 2 (crowding), where the results also support Observation 1. 
Figure 5 presents the results graphically for all groups.  Announcing a small sanction does not 
affect aggregate behavior. Practically none of the differences are significant. (Round-by-
round comparisons reveal one significant difference in round 2 of 9-person groups where 
more subjects choose R in the control than in the penalty treatment—chi
2=12.8, p<0.01).  All 
groups stay close to the equilibrium independent of the treatment and the round.
17 No time 
trend can be observed.  
 
                                                
17 In 9-person groups with an equilibrium point at 67% R-choices, 76% of the subjects choose R in the control 
and 65% in the penalty treatment on average. In 8-person groups, with the equilibrium point at 75% R-choices, 
74% of the subjects choose R in the control and 73% in the penalty treatment on average.  Finally, in 7-person 
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                             Figure 5: Percentage of R-choices in crowding games 
 
 
Observation 2: There is evidence that announcing a penalty changes beliefs.  
Our results of Game 3 (affiliation) support Observation 2. Figure 6 presents the results 
for affiliation games of all group sizes.  Introducing a sanction increased the likelihood of 
choosing R.  For groups of size 7 or 8, round-by-round comparisons reveal a significantly 
higher likelihood of choosing R in all rounds in the sanction treatments than in the control 
sessions. In 7-person groups, the introduction of the sanction does not take the strategic 
uncertainty completely away. While the sanction significantly increases the likelihood of 
choosing R, there remain 4 people (out of 28) who keep choosing L in rounds 4 and 5.   In 8-
person groups, players coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the sanction 
treatment by round 3, while coordination fails in the control treatment. With N=9, the groups 
in the sanction treatment coordinate perfectly on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium by round 4, 
whereas the groups in the control treatment coordinate imperfectly even in rounds 4 and 5. 
                                                                                                                                                  
groups, with an equilibrium at 86% R-choices, R is chosen by 82% of the subjects in the control and by 88% in 
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With N=9, however, levels of R-choices are so high in both groups that differences between 
control and experimental treatments are only marginally significant (r.1: p=0.05, r.2: p=0.10, 
r.3: p=0.16, r.4: p<0.01, r.5: p<0.01). 
 
                           Figure 6: Percentage of R-choices in coordination games 
 
 
Observation 3: The probability of successful coordination increases as the percentage of 
actors required to tip behavior to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium decreases.  
Recall that for groups of size 9, an interior equilibrium occurs at 67% R-choices. 
Round-by-round comparisons in the control treatments, as summarized in Table 5, reveal 
significant differences depending on whether or not the equilibrium point is above 67%.  
Groups with tipping points of 67% or below (n=9, n=10 or n=11) tend to coordinate on the 
Pareto-dominant equilibrium, and groups with tipping points above 67% (n=7 or n=8) tend to 
                                                                                                                                                  
the penalty treatment on average. 
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collapse to the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. By round 5, aggregate behavior has almost 
completely converged to one of the stable equilibria for all group sizes except n=9.   
 
Table 5: Probability of choosing R in the coordination game (control groups) 
Groups  R. 1   R. 2 
 
R. 3 
 
R. 4 
 
R. 5 
Size: n=11 - Interior equilibrium: 55%   76%  79%   82%  91% 
  
 94% 
  
Size: n=10 - Interior equilibrium: 60%  77% 
  
77% 
 
83% 
  
87% 
  
 97% 
Size: n= 9  - Interior equilibrium: 67%  67% 
  
70% 
 
85% 
  
70% 
  
 78% 
Size: n= 8  - Interior equilibrium: 75%  42% 
  
29% 
 
25% 
  
13% 
  
  8% 
Size: n= 7  - Interior equilibrium: 86%  32% 
  
29% 
 
18% 
  
21% 
  
  7% 
 
In our experiments, increasing group size makes coordination easier by decreasing the 
proportion of R-choosers required to tip to the Pareto-superior equilibrium.  Players in our 
experiments correctly regard choosing R as a safer strategy when the group’s size increases. 
But why can players coordinate merely by observing the payoffs, without a penalty or other 
communication? When multiple equilibria are Pareto-ranked, people may look for payoff-
dominance to resolve strategic uncertainty (Harsanyi and Selten 1988, Schelling 1960).
18  
Experimenters have tested whether a uniquely Pareto-dominant equilibrium provides a 
sufficient focal point to coordinate behavior in a set of multiple equilibria. The evidence 
suggests that people can coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in small groups. In 
larger groups (six or more members), however, coordination typically fails.
19  Our 
                                                
18 See for the empirical relevance of various selection criteria in coordination games, Cooper (1990) and Haruvy 
and Stahl (1998). 
19  For the comparison between groups of 2 and 14 (or 16) members in weak-link coordination games, see Van 
Huyck et al. (1990), between groups of 3 and 6, Knez and Camerer (1994) and for groups of 9, Cachon and 
Camerer (1996). An exception to large-group coordination failures is reported by Weber (1998). He shows that 
when groups are started small and additional players are added slowly enough, even large groups with 12 
members can avoid coordination failures.   
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experiments suggest that the percentage of players required for tipping is also relevant for the 
success or failure of coordination.
20 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We began this paper by distinguishing three possible effects of law:  deterrence, 
framing, and coordination.  Almost all of law and economics focuses on the deterrence 
effects of law and neglects coordination effects.   Deterrence causes actors to adjust behavior 
to equate marginal benefits and costs, which involves small changes, whereas coordination 
causes behavior to jump from one equilibrium to another, which involves large changes.  
Consequently, law and economics may concentrate on law’s small effects and neglects its 
large effects.   
Evaluating this possibility requires testing law’s coordination effects, which is 
inherently difficult.  Predictions based on multiple equilibria are difficult to falsify in field 
studies.  Unlike field studies, our experimental design allows us to isolate and separate the 
effects of changes in preferences and beliefs.  We compare games with unique Nash 
equilibria, where a sanction can only affect behavior by changing preferences, and games 
with multiple equilibria, where a sanction can help to select among them. In prisoner’s 
dilemma and crowding games, which have unique Nash equilibria, we find that introducing a 
penalty does not measurably affect preferences.  In affiliation games, which have multiple 
                                                
20 There is a possible caveat to our interpretation: in our design, the payoff for the Pareto-dominant equilibrium 
increases with group size (from $5.40 in 7-person groups to $9.00 in 11-person groups). Compared to the 
constant payoff for the Pareto-inferior equilibrium of $2.00, coordination becomes comparatively more 
attractive in larger groups. While the results for weak-link coordination games do not suggest that the payoff 
difference between the Pareto-dominant and the Pareto-inferior equilibrium matter (e.g. Van Huyck et al. 1990 
versus Weber 1998), we cannot exclude the possibility that the higher payoffs in larger groups helped people 
coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.  
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Nash equilibria, we find that such a penalty helps individuals to coordinate on the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium.
21 
We discuss some possible examples of coordination effects in law.  Lawmakers often 
have to decide whether or not to make a law whose enforcement is ineffective.  By 
“ineffective,” we mean that the sanction’s probability and severity are too low to deter 
wrongdoers.  Instead of deterring, such laws express an evaluation.  To illustrate, should the 
state impose a tax when the probability of enforcement is too low to deter rational people 
from evading it?  Some studies indicate that variables other than differences in expected 
sanctions explain difference in tax compliance across jurisdictions.
22  Specifically, the 
perceived likelihood that other people will pay taxes significantly affects individual 
compliance.
23  Coordination effects like those captured in our experiments may explain large 
differences in tax compliance from place to place.   
Similarly, police seldom enforce laws against smoking in public buildings or littering 
in public places, yet most people obey these laws in some countries and not in others. Field 
studies suggest that people are less likely to litter in a clean environment where most others 
do not litter, again suggesting a coordination game (Cialdini et al. 1990). Similar arguments 
may apply to large differences in compliance with laws governing speeding on the highway, 
jaywalking, shop-lifting, or riding public transportation without paying. 
                                                
21 This result is corroborated by a recent study by Tyran and Feld (2002) who introduce small sanctions in a 
public goods game and find no increase in cooperation if the sanction is exogenously imposed. 
22 See Andreoni (1998) for a survey of the literature on tax morale and a discussion and rejection of arguments 
that the expected fine or risk aversion can account for the observed tax compliance.  
23 See Gordon (1989) for a theoretical model in the spirit of Akerlof (1980), where the proportion of the 
population believed to consider evasion to be morally wrong determines the psychic cost of evasion, 
Pommerehne et al. (1994) for simulation results where tax compliance depends, among other things, on the 
likelihood that others have paid their taxes in the previous period, Posner (2000a) for the role of the social norm 
and compliance, and Sheffrin and Triest (1992) who analyze the 1987 Taxpayer Opinion Survey and find that 
perceiving other taxpayers as dishonest significantly decreases tax compliance. They argue: "Suppose, for 
example, that individuals who do not fully comply with the tax code experience more utility if aggregate 
noncompliance is higher. Perhaps this is because the guilt or stigma from noncompliance is eased when others 
are perceived to not comply as well. In this case, the relationship between individual and aggregate 
noncompliance can cause multiple equilibria." (p. 195)   
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Our experiments suggest an answer to the question of whether or not lawmakers 
should enact non-deterring laws. Enacting a law with non-deterring sanctions is most likely to 
change behavior when the underlying normative system has positive complementarities that 
cause multiple equilibria.  In these circumstances, introducing a non-deterring penalty can 
cause large jumps in behavior from one equilibrium to another.  Without positive 
complementarities, non-deterring laws have no lasting effects. 
Whereas we have been discussing laws that coordinate without deterring, in the usual 
case laws coordinate and deter.  To illustrate, based on the General Social Survey data from 
1972-1994, Glaeser and Glendon (1998) find that strategic complementarity is one of the key 
causes of gun ownership. Violence and gang membership among youth depends on fear and 
the need for self-defence, i.e. on the likelihood of others being violent. Coordinating around a 
lower level of gun ownership and violence thus requires a true belief that others will reduce 
gun ownership and violence. Recognizing this fact, researchers and public officials 
implemented a strategy in the "Boston Gun Project" consisting of more law enforcement, 
which deterred, and more public information about law enforcement, which coordinated.  
This prescription apparently created a true belief that others would have fewer guns and 
commit less violence, which created a new equilibrium (Piehl et al. 2000).   
Our results bear on a disagreement among legal scholars about how law causes social 
change, such as the decrease in racial discrimination in the U.S. Some scholars argue that law 
has an “expressive function” that changes behavior,
24 whereas other scholars deny that law 
has much influence on such phenomena as racial discrimination.
25 Our research suggests that 
law changes society by changing beliefs more than preferences.  According to this logic, laws 
imposing desegregation in the southern states may have changed behavior by changing 
                                                
24 See e.g. Cooter 1998, Ellickson 1996, McAdams 2000, Posner 2000b, Sunstein 1996. 
25  Rosenberg (1993) argues that, e.g. Brown v. Board of Education, failed to integrate southern schools. For 
other skeptical perspectives, see Adler (2000) and Anderson and Pildes (2000).   
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beliefs about the willingness of others to integrate.  Whereas beliefs changed relatively 
quickly, preferences probably changed relatively slowly.  
We have explained that coordination effects of law are large relative to deterrence 
effects in theory, we have described our experiments that isolate large coordination effects, 
and we have discussed some actual laws that seem to have large coordination effects.  Now 
we want to conclude on a cautionary note about using law to coordinate behavior.  When 
lawmakers create a new law, people sometimes coordinate around it and people sometimes 
ignore it.  The ability of lawmakers to coordinate the behavior of citizens, rather than being 
ignored, depends on the credibility of lawmakers. Lawmakers build credibility by enacting 
laws that cause people to change their true beliefs about the behavior of others.  Conversely, 
lawmakers undermine credibility by enacting laws that do not change behavior.  Predicting 
whether or not people will coordinate around a new law requires information about non-
marginal behavior, whereas deterrence only requires information about marginal behavior.  
Consequently, using law to coordinate requires lawmakers to understand citizens very well. 
To illustrate, tax administrators must know whether people perceive t axation as a 
coordination game with multiple equilibria or a public goods game with a dominant strategy 
to defect.  The effect of legal sanctions depends on the games people think they play, which 
requires much information.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1: Payoff Table for the prisoner's dilemma game (n=11) 
 
Number of 
Persons choosing L
Outcome for L 
(cents) 
Number of 
Persons choosing R 
Outcome for R 
(cents) 
0  --  11  500 
1  700  10  450 
2  650  9  400 
3  600  8  350 
4  550  7  300 
5  500  6  250 
6  450  5  200 
7  400  4  150 
8  350  3  100 
9  300  2  50 
10  250  1  0 
11  200  0  -- 
 
 
Table 2: Payoff table for the crowding game (n=11) 
Number of  
Persons choosing L 
Outcome for L 
(cents)  
Number of 
Persons choosing R 
Outcome for R 
(cents) 
0  --  11  500 
1  700  10  490 
2  650  9  480 
3  600  8  470 
4  550  7  460 
5  500  6  450 
6  450  5  440 
7  400  4  430 
8  350  3  420 
9  300  2  410 
10  250  1  400 
11  200  0  -- 
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Table 3: Payoff table for the coordination game (n=11) 
 
Number of 
Persons choosing L 
Outcome for L 
(cents)  
Number of 
Persons choosing R 
Outcome for R 
(cents) 
0  --  11  900 
1  700  10  810 
2  650  9  720 
3  600  8  630 
4  550  7  540 
5  500  6  450 
6  450  5  360 
7  400  4  270 
8  350  3  180 
9  300  2  90 
10  250  1  0 
11  200  0  -- 
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Appendix B 
 
Sample instructions for the sanction treatment in an 8-person coordination game 
 
Welcome to this research project!  
You are participating in a study in which you have the opportunity to earn cash. The actual amount of 
cash you will earn depends on your choices and the choices of the other persons in the study. At the 
end of the study, two rounds will be randomly selected and the amount you earned in these rounds 
will be added to the show-up fee of $5. In addition to these instructions, you receive an envelope 
containing  
-  a Code Number Form 
-  a Decision Form marked with your code number 
-  an envelope marked with your code number 
 
What the study is about: 
The study is on how people decide. You and 7 other persons have to choose between two alternatives, 
L and R. The payoff table tells you how much money you earn depending on what you choose and 
what the 7 other persons choose.  
 
How the study is conducted: 
The study is conducted anonymously and repeated five rounds. Participants are only identified by 
"code numbers". In order to guarantee privacy and anonymity,  do not show anyone your code 
number! You are randomly matched with 7 persons present in this room in each round.  
 
START  
The table reads as follows: 
If you and all other persons choose R, each of you earns 630 cents.  
If 1 person chooses L and 7 persons R, choosing L earns 570 cents and choosing R 540 cents.  
If 2 persons choose L and 6 persons R, choosing L earns 520 cents and choosing R 450 cents.  
… 
… 
If 6 persons choose L and 2 persons R, choosing L earns 320 cents and choosing R 90 cents. 
If 7 persons choose L and 1 person R, choosing L earns 270 and choosing R 0 cents.  
If you and all other persons choose L, each of you earns 220 cents.  
 
Payoff Table 
Number of 
Persons choosing L 
Outcome for L 
(cents)  
Number of 
Persons choosing R 
Outcome for R 
(cents) 
0  --  8  630 
1  570  7  540 
2  520  6  450 
3  470  5  360 
4  420  4  270 
5  370  3  180 
6  320  2  90 
7  270  1  0 
8  220  0  -- 
 
Note: Choosing L will be punished. The penalty for choosing L instead of R is 200. This penalty will 
be enforced with a probability of 0.1.  
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Procedure: 
The same procedure is repeated in all rounds. 
 
Round 1:   
Please carefully read the payoff table before making a choice. Indicate your choice for Round 1, L or 
R, on the decision form, put it back into the envelope and then into the box, which we will pass 
around.  
 
We will now determine whether the penalty will be enforced or not. There is a deck of 9 black and 1 
red card. An experimental aide will pick a card. If the card is black, the penalty will not be enforced. 
If the card is red, the penalty will be enforced. End of round 1. 
 
We will now determine your earnings according to your choice and the choices of the other persons, 
and privately inform each of you how much money you earned in this round. For this purpose, we will 
again pass the box around. Please take the envelope marked with your code number out of the box. It 
contains the decision form now also indicating your earnings. Do not tell or show anybody else your 
result. 
 
The following four rounds:  
The exact same procedure as in Round 1 will be repeated in the following four rounds. You are 
randomly matched with 7 persons in this room. Please indicate your choice for ‘Round 2’ on the 
decision form, put it into the envelope and then into the box which we will pass around. We will then 
determine whether the penalty will be enforced or not. Your earnings will be computed again and you 
will be privately informed how much money you earned in this round.  
 
At the end of the study, we will randomly decide which two rounds are relevant for your payment. 
You are informed on this. For your own records, please write down how much you earned in this 
study. Please put the decision form back into the envelope and then into the box. Keep your code 
number form! 
 
END OF THIS STUDY. You are invited to collect your earnings right after the experiment by 
presenting your code number form. Your earnings will be in a sealed envelope marked with your code 
number.  
 
If you have any questions, please address them to Iris_Bohnet@Harvard.edu 
 
We thank you for participating in the study.  
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